From the accession of the Emperor Nicholas to the revolution of 1830, the Russian policy was in some measure absorbed by the war with the Porte. All the ancient theory of the Holy Alliance was abandoned for less undecided interests, and less fear was entertained concerning revolutions at the time the most complete revolution took place. Whatever judgment may be formed of the event of 1830, it must suddenly have awakened a new train of emotions in the Russian _chancellerie_; for the popular principle which had caused this violent irruption had demonstrated as much energy, as did formerly the military power of Napoleon, against whom all Europe had risen in arms. The old education of Nesselrode was here destined again to be of service to him; for the first consequence of the revolt was, though not exactly to _revive_ the treaties of the Holy Alliance, an old parchment which had fallen to pieces, at least to pave the way for a treaty of mutual guarantee. All private dissensions were naturally compelled to give way, that people might hasten to provide against the most pressing danger; Metternich appeared entirely to resume his former ideas, as if he were returning to the projects of 1815, and the diplomatic school abandoned many serious plans for the chances of a crusade against democratic principles. We are inclined to think Nesselrode did not dislike this reminiscence of the principles of political repression, being those which he most perfectly understood, and which he had particularly dwelt upon during his early years of study and labour: but age had now supervened; in 1830 Nesselrode was no longer young, and it is not at the second period of existence people are able to encounter the great perturbations which shake the world to its centre. In recapitulating the causes of the maintenance of peace, people have not sufficiently considered the dread of change that possessed those wearied existences. Truly, it was not without reason that the Greeks placed in the hands of the aged the decision concerning peace or war. Let us suppose Metternich with the impetuosity of youth, and Nesselrode fifteen years younger, who can tell what might have occurred? Perhaps a violent war might have broken out, and with it all the chances of disorder. The insurrection in Poland, however, gave plenty of occupation to Russia, and the ideas of the Emperor Nicholas on the subject of repression harmonised perfectly with those of his minister. What the Russian people desired was the union of Poland to Russia; and the amalgamation, which had so long been the constant subject of Nesselrode's thoughts, was, at last, on the point of being finally accomplished. He never fully entered into the prejudices of the old Muscovites on this point, but he, nevertheless, was of opinion that this divided nation, this double and simultaneous government, injured the political and administrative unity of Russia.