that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to be.” By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will. [Sidenote: _Twisse ut supra._ 346.] [Sidenote: Prov. 16. 4.] 8. It is a certain truth that all moral actions are performed by a physical power in respect of the sustentation of the will in its natural being while it acteth, and that the creature is conserved even in the act as it is natural, though there be obliquity in the will of the creature acting in reference to the law given, or made known unto it. And this _Arminius_ acknowledgeth in these words: _Necesse itaq; est, ut cum Deus potentiæ creaturæ actum aliquem permittit, creatura illa conservetur, ut sit, & vivat, potentia ejusdem permaneat, idonea ad actum producendum, nulla major vel æqualis potentia opponatur, objectum deniq; offeratur, & potentia permittatur_. From whence therefore to instance in the first sin of the Angels and _Adam_, besides the equal power and liberty of will that they had to sin or not to sin, it is manifest that God willed and determined not to withdraw his conservative power from them, but that they might be and live in the very act of their sinning. Neither did he withdraw that power they had, nor opposed a greater, or equal power to impede them, much less did he create or infuse any evil into their natures, nor put upon them any coaction of will, to inforce them to sin, but solely left them to the power and liberty of their own free wills. And though by his prescience he certainly knew that they would sin and fall, yet he determined in his purpose not to hinder them, but by his providential decree did set down how to guide and order that fall and defection the most advantagiously for his glory both in his Mercy and Justice. So that even in this there was no bare passive permission, separate and distinct from his will and decree in his providence, but only permission to the moral act of their wills, which by his wisdom, decree and providence, he ordered for his own glory, according to the Text: _The Lord hath made_ (or wrought) _all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_. The