After some time the defendant offered to pay the plaintiff the sum of '£6. 3s. 6d.', and the expense of the funeral and the surgeon, provided the plaintiff would bear the expenses of the lawsuit, which he was not in a condition to do, as probably it would amount to more than that money. On this account, therefore, the action was now brought into court. There was no proof that the defendant knew or suspected his dog to be mad, previously to his attacking the boy; but an animal known to have been bitten by a mad dog, ought either to have been at once destroyed, or so secured that it was impossible for him to do mischief. Lord Kenyon observed to the jury, that this was one of those causes which came home to the feelings of all, yet must not be carried farther than justice demanded. A cause like this never, perhaps, before occurred in a court of justice; but there had been many resembling it in point of principle. If a dog, known to be ill-tempered and vicious, did any person an injury without provocation, there could be no question that the owner of the dog was answerable, in a court of justice, for the injury inflicted. Here was a worse case. The dog by whom the child was bitten had been attacked by another that was undeniably rabid. His master was aware of this, and placed him in a state of partial confinement--a confinement so lax, and so inefficient, that this poor child had broken through it, and was bitten and died. What other people would have done in such a situation he could not tell; but, if he were asked what he would do, he answered, he certainly would kill the dog, however much of a favourite he had been, because no atonement was within the reach of his fortune to make to the injured party for such a dreadful visitation of Providence as this. It was not enough for the owner of such a dog to say, he took precaution to prevent mischief: he ought to have made it impossible that mischief could happen; and, therefore, as soon as there was any reasonable suspicion that the dog was rabid, he ought to have destroyed him. But, if the owner wished to save the animal, until he was satisfied of the actual state of the case, he ought to have secured him, so that every individual might be safe. Whether the defendant thought he had done all that was necessary, his lordship did not know; but this he knew, that the dog was not perfectly secured, otherwise this misfortune could not have happened.