[122] 1892. Schmoller $2,500,000,000 1892. Christians 3,250,000,000 1893-4. Koch 3,000,000,000 1905. v. Halle 4,000,000,000[A] 1913. Helfferich 5,000,000,000[B] 1914. Ballod 6,250,000,000 1914. Pistorius 6,250,000,000 1919. Hans David 5,250,000,000[C] [A] Plus $2,500,000 for investments other than securities. [B] Net investments, _i.e._ after allowance for property in Germany owned abroad. This may also be the case with some of the other estimates. [C] This estimate, given in the _Weltwirtschaftszeitung_ (June 13, 1919), is an estimate of the value of Germany's foreign investments as at the outbreak of war. [123] I have made no deduction for securities in the ownership of Alsace-Lorrainers and others who have now ceased to be German nationals. [124] In all these estimates, I am conscious of being driven by a fear of overstating the case against the Treaty, of giving figures in excess of my own real judgment. There is a great difference between putting down on paper fancy estimates of Germany's resources and actually extracting contributions in the form of cash. I do not myself believe that the Reparation Commission will secure real resources from the above items by May, 1921, even as great as the _lower_ of the two figures given above. [125] The Treaty (see Art. 114) leaves it very dubious how far the Danish Government is under an obligation to make payments to the Reparation Commission in respect of its acquisition of Schleswig. They might, for instance, arrange for various offsets such as the value of the mark notes held by the inhabitants of ceded areas. In any case the amount of money involved is quite small. The Danish Government is raising a loan for $33,000,000 (kr. 120,000,000) for the joint purposes of "taking over Schleswig's share of the German debt, for buying German public property, for helping the Schleswig population, and for settling the currency question." [126] Here again my own judgment would carry me much further and I should doubt the possibility of Germany's exports equaling her imports during this period. But the statement in the text goes far enough for the purpose of my argument. [127] It has been estimated that the cession of territory to France, apart from the loss of Upper Silesia, may reduce Germany's annual pre-war production of steel ingots from 20,000,000 tons to 14,000,000 tons, and increase France's capacity from 5,000,000 tons to 11,000,000 tons. [128] Germany's exports of sugar in 1913 amounted to 1,110,073 tons of the value of $65,471,500, of which 838,583 tons were exported to the United Kingdom at a value of $45,254,000. These figures were in excess of the normal, the average total exports for the five years ending 1913 being about $50,000,000. [129] The necessary price adjustment, which is required, on both sides of this account, will be made _en bloc_ later.