The Economic Consequences of the PeaceKeynes, John Maynard
History
The Economic Consequences of the Peace
Keynes, John Maynard
Economic history -- 1918-1945; Treaty of Versailles (1919 June 28); World War, 1914-1918 -- Economic aspects
It is worth while to point out in passing a further element in the
situation, namely, the opposition which existed between the "crushing"
policy of M. Clemenceau and the financial necessities of M. Klotz.
Clemenceau's aim was to weaken and destroy Germany in every possible
way, and I fancy that he was always a little contemptuous about the
Indemnity; he had no intention of leaving Germany in a position to
practise a vast commercial activity. But he did not trouble his head to
understand either the indemnity or poor M. Klotz's overwhelming
financial difficulties. If it amused the financiers to put into the
Treaty some very large demands, well there was no harm in that; but the
satisfaction of these demands must not be allowed to interfere with the
essential requirements of a Carthaginian Peace. The combination of the
"real" policy of M. Clemenceau on unreal issues, with M. Klotz's policy
of pretense on what were very real issues indeed, introduced into the
Treaty a whole set of incompatible provisions, over and above the
inherent impracticabilities of the Reparation proposals.
I cannot here describe the endless controversy and intrigue between the
Allies themselves, which at last after some months culminated in the
presentation to Germany of the Reparation Chapter in its final form.
There can have been few negotiations in history so contorted, so
miserable, so utterly unsatisfactory to all parties. I doubt if any one
who took much part in that debate can look back on it without shame. I
must be content with an analysis of the elements of the final compromise
which is known to all the world.
The main point to be settled was, of course, that of the items for which
Germany could fairly be asked to make payment. Mr. Lloyd George's
election pledge to the effect that the Allies were _entitled_ to demand
from Germany the entire costs of the war was from the outset clearly
untenable; or rather, to put it more impartially, it was clear that to
persuade the President of the conformity of this demand with our
pro-Armistice engagements was beyond the powers of the most plausible.
The actual compromise finally reached is to be read as follows in the
paragraphs of the Treaty as it has been published to the world.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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