People conceive the significance of the opposition too _formally_ and weakly when they want only to "dissolve" it in order to make room for a third thing that shall "unite." The opposition deserves rather to be _sharpened_. As Jew and Christian you are in too slight an opposition, and are contending only about religion, as it were about the emperor's beard, about a fiddlestick's end. Enemies in religion indeed, _in the rest_ you still remain good friends, and equal to each other, _e. g_. as men. Nevertheless the rest too is unlike in each; and the time when you no longer merely _dissemble_ your opposition will be only when you entirely recognize it, and everybody asserts himself from top to toe as _unique_.[153] Then the former opposition will assuredly be dissolved, but only because a stronger has taken it up into itself. Our weakness consists not in this, that we are in opposition to others, but in this, that we are not completely so; _i. e._ that we are not entirely _severed_ from them, or that we seek a "communion," a "bond," that in communion we have an ideal. One faith, one God, one idea, one hat, for all! If all were brought under one hat, certainly no one would any longer need to take off his hat before another. The last and most decided opposition, that of unique against unique, is at bottom beyond what is called opposition, but without having sunk back into "unity" and unison. As unique you have nothing in common with the other any longer, and therefore nothing divisive or hostile either; you are not seeking to be in the right against him before a _third_ party, and are standing with him neither "on the ground of right" nor on any other common ground. The opposition vanishes in complete--_severance_ or singleness.[154] This might indeed be regarded as the new point in common or a new parity, but here the parity consists precisely in the disparity, and is itself nothing but disparity, a par of disparity, and that only for him who institutes a "comparison." The polemic against privilege forms a characteristic feature of liberalism, which fumes against "privilege" because it itself appeals to "right." Further than to fuming it cannot carry this; for privileges do not fall before right falls, as they are only forms of right. But right falls apart into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by might, _i. e._ when one understands what is meant by "Might goes before right." All right explains itself then as privilege, and privilege itself as power, as--_superior power_. But must not the mighty combat against superior power show quite another face than the modest combat against privilege, which is to be fought out before a first judge, "Right," according to the judge's mind? * * * * *