The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885Royle, Charles
History
The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885
Royle, Charles
Egypt -- History -- British occupation, 1882-1936; Sudan -- History
The general character of the ground lying between the two armies was
that of gently undulating, pebbly slopes, rising gradually to an open
plateau from ninety to a hundred feet above the valley through which the
railway and canal ran. To have marched over this plateau upon the
enemy's position by daylight, the British troops would have had to
advance over a glacis-like slope, absolutely without cover, in full view
of the enemy, and under the fire of his artillery, for about five miles.
Such an operation would have entailed heavy loss from an enemy with men
and guns protected by intrenchments from any artillery fire which the
attacking force could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the
Egyptian position, either by the right or left, was an operation which
would have entailed a wide turning movement, and, therefore, a long,
difficult and fatiguing march, and moreover would not have accomplished
the object Wolseley had in view, namely, that of grappling with the
enemy at such close quarters that he would be unable to shake himself
free, except by a general fight of all his army. The object was to make
the battle a final one, whereas a wide turning movement would probably
only have forced Arabi to retreat upon the cultivated country in his
rear, where, the land being irrigated and cut up in every direction by
deep canals, it would have been difficult for a regular army to follow
him. Influenced by these considerations, and also by the information
that the enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night,
Wolseley determined upon the difficult operation of a night march, to be
followed by an attack on the Egyptian position before daylight.
As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 12th September, the camp at
Kassassin was struck, and all the tents and baggage were stacked
alongside the railway. The camp fires were left burning. The troops then
moved into position near a spot described as "Ninth Hill." There they
formed in order of battle and bivouacked--no fires were allowed, even
smoking was prohibited, and all were ordered to maintain the utmost
silence.[61]
The formation of the troops was as follows:--
On the right, the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Willis,
and consisting of two brigades, viz., the 2nd, under Major-General
Graham, in front, and the 1st, or Guards Brigade, under the Duke of
Connaught, in the rear; on the left, the 2nd Division, commanded by
Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, and consisting of two brigades,
viz., the 3rd, or Highland Brigade, under Major-General Sir Archibald
Alison, in front, and the 4th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ashburnham, in
the rear. Between the two Divisions was placed the Artillery Brigade
under Brigadier-General Goodenough. On the extreme right was the Cavalry
Division under Major-General Drury-Lowe, and on the extreme left, under
Major-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, were the Indian Contingent and the
Naval Brigade.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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