6. But we must not so think of relation, as if it were an accident differing from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of them, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the likeness of one _white_ to another _white_, or its unlikeness to _black_, is the same accident with its _whiteness_; and _equality_ and _inequality_, the same accident with the _magnitude_ of the thing compared, though under another name: for that which is called _white_ or _great_, when it is not compared with something else, the same when it is compared, is called _like_ or _unlike_, _equal_ or _unequal_. And from this it follows that the causes of the accidents, which are in relatives, are the causes also of _likeness_, _unlikeness_, _equality_ and _inequality_; namely, that he, that makes two unequal bodies, makes also their inequality; and he, that makes a rule and an action, makes also, if the action be congruous to the rule, their congruity; if incongruous, their incongruity. And thus much concerning _comparison_ of one body with another. [Sidenote: Of the beginning of individuation.] 7. But the same body may at different times be compared with itself. And from hence springs a great controversy among philosophers about the _beginning of individuation_, namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one time the same, at another time not the same it was formerly. For example, whether a man grown old be the same man he was whilst he was young, or another man; or whether a city be in different ages the same, or another city. Some place _individuity_ in the unity of _matter_; others, in the unity of _form_; and one says it consists in the unity of the _aggregate of all the accidents together_. For _matter_, it is pleaded that a lump of wax, whether it be spherical or cubical, is the same wax, because the same matter. For _form_, that when a man is grown from an infant to be an old man, though his matter be changed, yet he is still the same numerical man; for that _identity_ which cannot be attributed to the matter, ought probably to be ascribed to the form. For the _aggregate of accidents_, no instance can be made; but because, when any new accident is generated, a new name is commonly imposed on the thing, therefore he, that assigned this cause of _individuity_, thought the thing itself also was become another thing. According to the first opinion, he that sins, and he that is punished, should not be the same man, by reason of the perpetual flux and change of man's body; nor should the city, which makes laws in one age and abrogates them in another, be the same city; which were to confound all civil rights. According to the second opinion, two bodies existing both at once, would be one and the same numerical body. For if, for example, that ship of Theseus, concerning the difference whereof made by continual reparation in taking out the old planks and putting in new,