uninhibited output of energy that we have described we call _free_. They are equally manifested by the cat who springs upon and catches the mouse she has been warily watching, and by the violoncello virtuoso who scurries safely through the cadenza and arrives at the _tutti_ without having either produced a “wolf tone” or dropped his bow. It is such action which is connoted by the popular phrase “free will.” The final touch to our delineation of freedom may be added by saying that _only when a man’s actions result in enlarging his environment, and in providing him with increasing opportunities for turning his wishes into wills, is he in the highest sense ethically free_. The preceding characterizations of the free man were derived from simply watching him _in the midst_ of any of a thousand activities. This last part of the picture is obtained by reckoning the permanent ethical assets which his efforts have provided. These assets are, moreover, defined in terms of a continuing freedom. For while we are all in a sense free to do anything within our ability, and for which there is the time, the place, and the opportunity, yet only under certain conditions can we follow such an action with another of our own choosing. The liar, the thief, and the slanderer know very well to what an extent their putative freedoms produce antagonists of their own making with whom they must ever thereafter wage a dismal conflict. On the other hand, the man of frankness and a truthful tongue, the man who makes fair bargains with the universe, and the man who can solve his problems without the loss of his own temper or the respect of other persons, is ipso facto equipped with the ability to synergize his muscles repeatedly into freely willed activities. Moreover, while this fifth type of freedom is dependent upon the presence of the other four, its effect upon them is reflexively beneficial, in making more actions physically possible, reducing the external hindrances to them, increasing the skill by which they are performed, and insuring the continuity with which they are carried out. Indeed, we may now identify virtue with the attainment of this last type of freedom, and vice with its loss or decline. Such activity is also right, and its stimulus is a dependable good.