From all this it can be seen that the assertion of a legal right is not always equivalent to its substantiation. Times change, bringing with them new faces and other minds, new problems and new interpretations. Nor, for that matter, are all commonly accepted rights under the law equally to be supported by physical force. Strictly speaking, only those rights which imply a correlative duty are truly legal rights. Reciprocity of action is essential. For example, if Baker has a legally recognized or substantiated right to do, receive, or enjoy something, it is the duty of Atkins and others not to infringe or nullify that right. Mark also, that both duty and right here imply that physical force may be directed against some specified person, or against all persons generally in case of need, in order to establish the claim and protect the interest involved. However, as may be already suspected, not everything that is legally sanctioned or which enters into legal machinery has the same force behind it as in the case we have just cited. The right of ownership, for example, which to the layman seems to be a unit right, involves five distinct things, as follows: (1) the _jus disponendi_, or right to give away, (2) the _jus utendi_, or right to use, (3) the _jus abutendi_, or the right to abuse, (4) the _jus prohibendi_, the right to keep others away, and (5) the _jus possidendi_, or the right to recover the property. But only one of these is, strictly speaking, a right in the sense that it involves a correlative duty, namely, the _jus prohibendi_. For the _jus disponendi_ is simply a power, and not a right at all: and the _jus utendi_ is wholly negative in the legal sense, implying non-interference in the exercise of a natural power; whereas the _jus abutendi_ is a liberty (neither a right nor a power) whose exercise is nominally unrestricted: while the _jus possidendi_ is simply the legal capacity to get back that which one is said to own. This ends our account of legal rights. We now pass to the consideration of the other uses of this most comprehensive ethical concept. Somewhat by way of contrast to that which has just preceded, let us at once consider CLASS F, under which are comprised what are popularly known as “moral” _rights_.[15]