A casual glance at the appended list of the members of this class might lead one to consider them simply as a continuation of legal rights, but this is by no means the case. Albeit moral rights are identical with legal rights in so far as they imply a multitude of human claims and interests, they are nevertheless emphatically different from them on a much more important point. Moral rights lack all implications of an organized physical force to compel their recognition. The only compulsions that can be said to assist in the establishment of the claims and the protection of the interests comprised under the scope of moral rights are the approval and disapproval of the group which undertakes to recognize and support them. In fine, these compulsions amount to the force of public opinion. And while this force is at times provocative of changes in the method or content of the law which may later be recognized as good, on the whole, public opinion is usually so unspecific and inconstant as to be wholly negligible as a power to enforce any demands. Certainly no jurist regards moral right as obligatory. On still another count moral rights show a serious defect. For when we say that the enforcement of the claims and interests comprised within the scope of moral rights depends upon the approval of the group, it must not be supposed that the actions of any group and the actions which it approves are necessarily one and the same. This is a sour paradox, but its appropriateness cannot be successfully denied. The standard of conduct which any group subscribes to under pressure, either in writing, or before an audience, is singularly different from the behavior of the group under easier circumstances. Moreover, it is the exception, and not the rule, for those who dominate a group,—whether such masters be parents, political bosses, or any other form of lordling,—to hold their charges to a stricter accountability than they themselves, removed from correlative restraints, recognize as imperative. Doubtless, in the execution of the law, many a time privileges are granted to people of wealth and prestige which are denied to the humbler petitioners at the bar; but the difference between legal and moral practice is significantly this: that in legal practice evasions are no integral part of the machinery. This does not amount to a condemnation of moral rights: it is merely holding up the mirror to man, in order that he may see himself clearly. All in all, consistency may be as impracticable as it has been unsought for in the daily affairs of men. However, when we consider the unusual claims made in behalf of moral rights, there are valid exceptions to be taken to them. For while in the strict legal sense, moral right is impotent, yet according to the expressed opinion of the untutored majority, moral right is far mightier than legal right. Let us see why this is so.