The ethics of Hercules : $b A study of man's body as the sole determinant of ethical valuesGivler, Robert Chenault
Philosophy
The ethics of Hercules : $b A study of man's body as the sole determinant of ethical values
Givler, Robert Chenault
Ethics; Psychophysiology
Once more, then, we realize that “virtue” and “vice” are not true
antonyms. We saw this to be the case with “good” and “bad,” and
likewise with “right” and “wrong.” It is only when these pairs of
terms are used with the most severely restricted denotation, that
is, with a provincial bias, that their opposition and contradiction
appears. Such bias is also shown, when it is said that the glutton
and the debauché “really know that they shouldn’t” indulge themselves
as they do, a statement which signifies something like this: If these
men who do what I call “wrong” were only to act as I direct, they
would not be censured. Obviously so, but what a host of fallible
assumptions this involves! It is merely ignoring the problem, and
such a treatment furnishes no hint as to its solution. One begins
to doubt the validity of all praise and blame as profitable ethical
instruments. Besides, the appeal to self-censure, as employed in
the above case, is, in the end, relatively inefficacious in actual
practice, and is hence illogical as a basic principle in ethical
theory. Indeed, it is idle to say that we all know what we should
do; if we had that much information, we would act upon it, for the
will and the intellect, as Spinoza remarked, are one and the same.
The great need in ethics is to get right down to the empirical facts
of conduct and to let them teach us, rather than to hide the facts
behind a screen of pious insincerity. Importunate chiding may be a
traditional tool of morality, but it does not contribute anything to
the establishment of an ethical science.
Consequently we shall have to reject any definition of the vices
which goes no further than to describe them as those actions which
some observer regards as unprofitable. It may be that such a
definition superficially fits a great many cases, but great danger
lies in accepting it without scrutiny, since it tends to imply
that ethics is merely a study of _opinions_ about conduct, and not
of conduct itself. Now, no other science is a study of opinions,
not even the normative sciences of bridge-building or landscape
gardening; and ethics is no exception to this general rule. Moreover,
since we do not know of any absolutely wise observer to whose opinion
we can appeal in every doubtful case, a true definition of vice has
not yet been achieved.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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