The ethical implications of the foregoing must have already been guessed. Is it not possible to define the virtuous man as the relaxed, resilient, coordinate individual, and the vicious man as either the muscularly flabby, and therewith the lazy, spineless, procrastinating, lecherous man; or else as the abnormally hypertonic organism, whose muscles constantly pay dividends of wrath, and whose grudges and malice are carried even through his slumber? If so, there should be no paradox implied in speaking of virtue and vice as functions of the human organism. FOOTNOTES: [19] Compare the expression, “And now abideth faith, hope, and charity” with “And now there are faithful men, hopeful men, and charitable men.” Only the latter of these statements has any real meaning. [20] Plato’s list is very brief, and his virtues correspond to the three parts of the soul as he conceived it. Self-control, courage, and wisdom are the three virtues which characterize the desire, the will, and the reason respectively, while the supreme virtue is a harmony or health of the soul. For Aristotle, virtue is found in a moderation between extremes. For example, the virtue of courage is a mean between cowardliness and rashness. Others of his virtues likewise derived are: temperance, liberality, high-mindedness, mildness, friendliness, candor, urbanity, and justice. The Christian virtues, while never stated in systematic form, are typically represented by humility, kindliness, self-denial, meekness, patience, temperance, and, perhaps, other-worldliness. Comparatively few ethical writers attempt to give a list or scale of virtues and vices, and some of them ignore the question completely. Martineau, in a somewhat successful attempt to free himself from an irreconcilable dualism in ethics, presents a scale of traits beginning, presumably, with vices (e. g., censoriousness, vindictiveness, suspiciousness), and ending with virtues (compassion, reverence, and veracity). In the application of this system, the chief question is, not what is bad or what is good, but simply, which trait is better and which worse than another. [21] It is to be observed that Jesus was much more specific and empirical than either Plato or St. Paul, since in his treatment of this phase of the problem of conduct, Jesus often described the situation concretely, e. g., “those persecuted for righteousness’ sake,” rather than by employing, as did Plato and St. Paul, abstract nouns, such as “courage,” “charity,” and the like. But it must also not be forgotten that of all the ethical teachers of antiquity, Socrates alone consistently stuck to the concrete realities of ethics and constantly admitted the size and difficulties of the problems involved. CHAPTER VIII IS CONSCIENCE ALWAYS A PATHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON?