The law in Pennsylvania[99] is: "If any person, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administer to her any poison, drug, or substance whatsoever, or shall unlawfully use any instrument, or other means whatsoever, with the like intent, such person shall be guilty of felony, and being thereof convicted, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and undergo an imprisonment, by separate or solitary confinement at labor, not exceeding three years." It makes no difference in Pennsylvania law whether the child is quickened or not. [99] _Laws of Pennsylvania_, Act of March 31, 1860, sec. 88. p. 404. The New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin laws are like the Pennsylvania law. The law in Iowa[100] is: "If any person, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any pregnant woman, wilfully administer to her any drug or substance whatever, or, with such intent, use any instrument or other means whatever, unless such miscarriage shall be necessary to save her life, he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years, and be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars." To the same effect are the laws in Connecticut, Maine, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, Texas, and Maryland. [100] _Laws of 1897_, Iowa Code, 4759. Frank Winthrop Draper, professor of legal medicine in Harvard University,[101] commenting on the Massachusetts law of October, 1903, cap. 212, secs. 15, 16, says: "It is important to recognize the fact that the law does not make any exception or formal recognition in favor of justifiable operations to procure premature labor. The statute is general in its application. It is, of course, obvious that the best sentiment of the medical profession and of obstetric teachers is favorable to interference of pregnancy, (1) whenever there is such anatomical deviation or mechanical obstruction in the mother's pelvis that the birth of a child is impossible; or (2) whenever the mother is suffering from such grave disease that her life is in imminent peril and can be saved only by the arrest of gestation. Under such conditions the physician is not only warranted in inducing premature labor, but is required to do so by a sense of duty to his patient, with a view thereby to save one life at least, and, if possible, the lives of both mother and offspring. [101] _Legal Medicine_, 1905.