It begins to look as though the social scientist working with his regular
habits is actually a dialectician without a dialectical basis. His
dilemma is that he can neither use his terms with the simple directness
of the natural scientist pointing to physical factors, nor with the
assurance of a philosopher who has some source for their meaning in the
system from which he begins his deduction. Or, the social scientist
is trying to characterize the world positively in terms which can be
made good only dialectically. He can never make them good dialectically
as long as he is by theory entirely committed to empiricism. This
explains why to the ordinary beholder there seem to be so many smuggled
assumptions in the literature of social science. It will explain,
moreover, why so much of its expression is characterized by diffuseness
and by that verbosity which is certain to afflict a dialectic without a
metaphysic or an ontology. This uncertainty of the social scientist about
the nature of his datum often leads him to treat empirical situations as
if they carried moral sanction, and then to turn around and treat some
point of contemporary mores—which is by definition a “moral” question—as
if it had only empirical aspects. In direct consequence, when the
social scientist should be writing “positively,” like a crack newspaper
reporter, one finds him writing like Hegel, and, when the stage of his
exposition might warrant his writing more or less like Hegel, one finds
him employing dialectical terms as if they had positive designations.
Paradoxically, his very reverence for facts may tend to make him sound
like Hegel or some other master of categorical thinking. Anyone sampling
the literature of social science cannot fail to be impressed with the
proportion of space given to definition. Indeed, one of the most
convincing claims of the science is that our present-day knowledge of
man is defective because our definitions are simplistic. His behavior is
much more varied than the unscientific suppose; and therefore a central
objective of social study is definition, which will take this variety
into account and supplant our present “prejudiced” definitions. With this
in mind, the social scientist toils in library or office to prepare the
best definitions he can of human nature, of society, and of psychosocial
environment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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