Wadsworth reiterated this opinion all spring, while Bryant heard from Gen. John Pope and Gen. Hitchcock in the same vein. It was not until May 5 that McClellan fought his first battle, though he had held command since the preceding July. The _Evening Post_ was full of hope in the Peninsular campaign that followed, warning McClellan not to overestimate the enemy’s forces, and that “hitherto our great fault has been that we have not followed up our successes.” Its dejection was proportionately great when in the first days of July the campaign ended in failure, and McClellan withdrew his army from the position he had reached immediately in front of Richmond. The disgust of the radicals with McClellan was now complete, and the _Post_ was as eloquent as the _Tribune_ or _Times_ in attacking him. On July 3 it mournfully remarked that “while the cause cannot perhaps be defeated even by incompetence,” it could be gravely imperilled. “We have suffered long enough from inaction and overcaution. Henceforth we must have action.... If it be asked who is the best man, we can only say that it is Mr. Lincoln’s business to know, but bitter experience has taught us that Gen. McClellan is not.” Lincoln was admonished that he must open his eyes without a moment’s delay to the exigency, dismiss every slothful or imbecile leader, infuse energy and unity into his Cabinet, and recruit new armies. It was now that the _Post_ began asking for conscription, while it gave a ringing endorsement to Lincoln’s call for “three hundred thousand more.” The _Herald_, incapable of blaming a Democrat like McClellan, in July attacked Stanton for the army’s failure, but the _Evening Post_ showed that McClellan himself had said that he had more than enough troops to take Richmond. The Chicago _Tribune_ later accused it of injustice to Lincoln in saying that McClellan should have been dismissed earlier, since Lincoln could not do so without offending loyal Democrats. That, rejoined the _Post_, is precisely the ground for our objection to McClellan; he was retained for political, not military, reasons. These July days were the days in which Lincoln grew thin and haggard, Seward was sent upon a circuit of the North to arouse public men in support of the new enlistment programme, and Lowell wrote, “I don’t see how we are to be saved but by a miracle.” Who should succeed McClellan? Chase and Welles believed that the best general in view for the eastern command was John Pope, whose victory at Island No. 10 had given him national fame; and Bryant and Godwin, who had had some personal contact with Pope, agreed. He was called east and given the Army of Virginia. The chief command, however, went to Halleck, whom the _Evening Post_ distrusted as much as Welles did, and had already (July 23) described as slower and less enterprising than McClellan.