Opening the text

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)

Philosophy

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia

Name: The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Author: Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)

Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)

World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness
     of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of
     Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to
     the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia
     originally suggested.

     Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and
     Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German
     Government may be able to make use of the Russian
     communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.
     His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any
     act which may precipitate matters.[81]

[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]

At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired,
but the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August
1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's
telegram last quoted,

     spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute
     was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only
     drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and
     Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and
     Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to
     me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and
     continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of
     State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to
     discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,
     had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have
     been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering
     Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused
     Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her
     mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she
     could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without
     making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the
     speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the
     German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time
     to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide
     dominions _. The situation now was that, though the
     Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the
     specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,
     therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German
     representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within
     a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the
     Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as
     creating a state of war.[82]

[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]

Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.

Opening the text

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)

Philosophy

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia

Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)

World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness
     of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of
     Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to
     the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia
     originally suggested.

     Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and
     Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German
     Government may be able to make use of the Russian
     communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.
     His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any
     act which may precipitate matters.[81]

[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]

At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired,
but the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August
1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's
telegram last quoted,

     spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute
     was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only
     drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and
     Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and
     Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to
     me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and
     continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of
     State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to
     discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,
     had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have
     been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering
     Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused
     Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her
     mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she
     could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without
     making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the
     speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the
     German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time
     to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide
     dominions _. The situation now was that, though the
     Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the
     specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,
     therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German
     representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within
     a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the
     Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as
     creating a state of war.[82]

[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]

Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia

The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia

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