The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to
Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be
averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no
telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of
Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my
army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your
Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until
I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to
enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to
commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of
our frontiers.
In this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of
the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia
should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its enemies," while
Germany and Austria, without making any real concession in the
direction of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and
defense.
There were practical reasons which made the Kaiser's demand
unreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece
of governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities
are of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily
takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of
transportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization
order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great
Empire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact,
for in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with
respect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:
I just received the communication from Your Government
offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great
Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under
these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking
France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had
already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against
two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be
countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so
late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be
guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course
refrain from attacking France and employ My troops
elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The
troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by
telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]
[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due
to a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir
Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King George promptly
corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.
See also Addendum, p. 192.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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