The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
The defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems
to be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that "England and
France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium."
They say:
It would have been a crime against the German people if the
German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The
inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual,
whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to
resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times
of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a
friendly neutrality, which would permit the unobstructed
passage of German troops through small portions of her
territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German
General Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to
avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most
unfavorable ground.
In other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that
it should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason
Belgium must be ruined.
Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abhorrent
in their political immorality, it is yet gravely suggested by Dr.
Dernberg and others that Bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect the
true thought of the Prussian ruling classes. Here are representative
theologians, economists, historians, statesmen, diplomatists,
financiers, inventors, and educators, who, in invoking the support of
the educated classes in the United States, deliberately subscribe to
a proposition at which even Machiavelli might have gagged.
We are further told that "the German troops, with their iron
discipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the
individual in Belgium just as they did in France in 1870," and these
scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity add that "Belgium
would have been wise, if it had permitted the passage of the German
troops," for the Belgian people "_would have fared well from the
business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer
and paid well._"
To this defense we are led in the last analysis, that Belgium should
have preferred cash to her honor, just as the German General Staff
preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military
advantage.
The possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the
attempt of these apologists for Germany to defend the forcible
invasion of Belgium.
The ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon
the express contractual obligations of England, Germany, and France
with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The indictment of Germany
has been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the
Treaty of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had
obligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both
of Luxemburg and Belgium.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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