The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
If the German Chancellor is truthful in his statement that on August
the 4th, when he spoke in the Reichstag and an hour later had his
conversation with Goschen, he had "certain indications" that Belgium
had forfeited its rights as an independent nation by hostile acts,
then the German Chancellor took such a serious view of "Germany's
responsibilities" that, without any necessity or justification, he
indicted his country at the bar of the whole world of a flagrant
wrong. If he could not at that time justify the act of the German
General Staff, he should at least have been silent, but, according to
his incredible statement, although he had these "certain indications"
and thus _knew_ that Germany, in invading Belgium, was simply
attacking an already hostile country, he deliberately explains, not
only to his nation but to the whole world, that such invasion was a
wrong and had no justification in international law. How can any
reasonable man, whose eyes are not blinded with the passions of the
hour, accept this explanation?
It is even more remarkable that immediately following the session of
the Reichstag, when he had his interview with Goschen, the German
Chancellor never suggested in his own defense or that of his country,
that he had "certain indications," which justified the action that day
taken, although he then knew that, unless he could justify it, England
would immediately join the already powerful foes of Germany.
The reader need only reread Goschen's report of that interview
(_ante_, p. 214) to know how disingenuous this belated explanation
is. With the whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the German
Chancellor, after five months of reflection, can only make this
pitiful defense. Its acceptance subjects even the most credulous to
a severe strain. It exhausts the limit of gullibility.
The defense wholly ignores the fact that the Chancellor had previously
sought to bribe England to condone in advance the invasion of Belgium
by Germany, and that Germany had also coerced Luxemburg into a passive
acquiescence in a similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense
that Luxemburg had failed in its obligation of neutrality.
Should the judgment of the civilized world turn from the terrible fate
of Belgium and consider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, then the
German Chancellor may, unless better advised, frame further maladroit
excuses with reference to that country.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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