The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
What that judgment will be it is not difficult to determine, for the
evidence in the case can admit of but one conclusion. It may be, as
Mr. George Bernard Shaw says, that in the contending nations, the ears
are too greatly deafened by the roar of the cannon and the eyes too
blinded by the smoke of battle, to reach a dispassionate conclusion.
But in the neutral States of the world, and especially in that
greatest of all the neutral Powers, the United States of America, a
judgment has been pronounced that is unmistakable.
The great Republic is more free than any other nation to reach a just
conclusion "without fear, favor, or affection." Without alliances with
any Power and with no practical interest in the European balance of
power, itself composed of men of all the contending nations, it can,
above every other people, proceed to judgment, "with malice toward
none and with charity for all."
It is a tribute to its unique position among the nations of the world
that from the beginning of the war each of the contending Powers
has invoked its judgment. The Kaiser, the President of the French
Republic, and the King of Belgium have each in an especial way sought
its moral support, while to the other nations the question of the
attitude of the United States has been one of practical and recognized
importance.
If the United States is thus a moral arbiter in the greatest war of
history, its judgment is now, and may hereafter increasingly become, a
potential factor of great significance.
The nature of that judgment is already apparent to all men. The people
of the United States, numbering nearly one hundred millions, have
reached, with an amazing approach to unanimity, certain clear and
definite conclusions.
These conclusions maybe summarized as follows:
1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace
secretly concerted to impose their will upon Europe in a
matter affecting the balance of power. Whether in so doing
they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the
hegemony of Europe is not satisfactorily established,
although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a
possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (_a_)
issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
disproportionate to any grievance that Austria may have had,
and (_b_) in giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time
to consider the rights and obligations of all interested
nations.
2. That Germany had at all times the power to induce Austria
to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no
time effectively exerted its influence. On the contrary, it
certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its
unreasonable course.
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