The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the rôle of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity" (so says the German _White Paper_ with sardonic humor),
replied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."
Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more
than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria
would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that
Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had
given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign
Affairs
said, quietly, but firmly, _that no discussion could be
accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would
be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific
character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own,
might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just
and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
directly between the two parties immediately concerned.
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept
the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness
of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested "the larger
aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this
"larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some
ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he
had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
postponed.[35]
[Footnote 35: English _White Paper_, No. 62.]
The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus
failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to
preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th had a
further conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for
peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and
Servia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light
of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation _in
extenso_:
I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it
was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating
the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia,
should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious
guarantees for its future relations with Servia.
_I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the
dangers to the peace of Europe_ which would be brought about
by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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