The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
It has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was
the French Ambassador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de
Margerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 documents,
classified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods
of time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is
somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is
thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.
The French _Yellow Book_ confirms the impression that France was most
fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of
Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a
diplomat as M. Jules Cambon.
Throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply
impressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany
are themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in
its incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for
conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince
Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding
principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to
isolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him
as effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated
this war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.
In the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due
to the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its
diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--_une
petite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide_, as Bismarck once described
them--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly
attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly
or unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany,
consolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them
simultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not
wise statecraft. The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset
these blundering disciples of Machiavelli.
Russia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their
representatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual
distinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished
diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in
various capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor
of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Washington, already
knew, what the documents in the French _Yellow Book_ so clearly
reveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability.
With acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful
events, in which he was a participant. To his calm and well-poised
intellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear
integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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