The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared
overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon
William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings
of the Court, and, above all, _the impatience of the
soldiers_, are gaining more ascendency over his mind.
Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the
popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position
of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its
power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last
increase in the German army, the object of which was to
place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for
something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it
is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may
ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his
Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King
of the Belgians, and _to lead him not to resist in case a
conflict with us should arise_[37]....
[Footnote 37: French _Yellow Book_, No. 6.]
This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.
Germany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the
Kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his
somewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated
the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a
war, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose
policy. Until that time he had been quite content to _play_ the part
of Cæsar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire
to _be_ a Cæsar. To describe himself metaphorically as "clad in
shining armor" and to shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose.
"And so he played his part." As long as the world was content to take
this imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial
_impresario_ found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus
on the boards of the Berlin Theater.
The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning
of a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the
torch to civilization itself.
Prior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than
the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference
for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost
him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too
recent to be ignored.
In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to
all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally,
presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases,
and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a
very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans
favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word
was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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