Thus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action the representatives of England, France, and Russia were evaded until the time limit for Servia had expired. Contrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which Sazonof attempted to reach an agreement with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, under that date. He says: The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the last instant," he said to me. It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szápáry[50] to come and see him for a "frank and loyal explanation." In his presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting character of the different clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, _and I will guarantee the result_."[51] [Footnote 50: The Austrian Ambassador.] [Footnote 51: French _Yellow Book_, No. 54.] Upon one phase of Germany's foreign policy in this crisis the French _Yellow Book_ naturally throws more light than the other publications. I refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France into a position of neutrality, or possibly to secure from it some definition of its attitude, which would compromise its relations with Russia. The _Yellow Book_ charges that the German Ambassador, under the pretext of securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public excitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The documents go far to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing. The German Ambassador on July the 24th, the very day that the ultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von Jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called upon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal note, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he characterized it as a note of importance. It may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic crisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated. In his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says: