The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
The Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability.
Time and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may
be to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless
energy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict
will go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot,
Germany's real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it
was the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser
has united his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia and
England into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple
Alliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results,
he has gained the doubtful coöperation of moribund Turkey, of which he
is likely to say before many months are over: "Who shall deliver me
from the body of this death?"
In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for
eventualities.
The Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for
the war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and
secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having
visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Ambassador, and
made the following significant offer:
[67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His
Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his
continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to
make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He
said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the
main principle which governed British policy, that Great
Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the
object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of
Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given
to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed
at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,
should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and
he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in
that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency
said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was
ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she
would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France
what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would
be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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