The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
In what follows, we shall have to consider: I. the origin of the idea
of cause in experience; II. its generalisation, and passage from the
individual subjective, to the objective form; III. its transformation as
resulting from the work performed in the various sciences, its scission
into two fundamental ideas: on the one hand, that of force, energy,
active and effective power, cause in the true sense (_vera causa_), which
tends more and more to become a postulate, an x, a metaphysical residuum;
on the other, that of a constant and invariable succession, a fixed
_relation_, which becomes the scientific form of the concept of cause,
equivalent in all respects to the concept of law.
I. Every one seems agreed, fundamentally at least, upon the empirical
origin of the idea of cause. It is of internal, subjective origin;
suggested to us by our motor activity. A being who was hypothetically
perfectly passive, while seeing or feeling constant external sequences,
would have no idea of causality. It would be superfluous to show, by
multiplying our quotations, that spiritualists like Maine de Biran,
empiricists like Mill, critics like Renouvier, all the schools in short,
with varying formulæ, agree upon this point. At the same time it must
not be overlooked that some writers attribute an exclusive privilege
to the “will,” maintaining it to be the type of causality; whereas the
assertion that “our own voluntary action is the exclusive source whence
this idea is derived” is unjustifiable. If, with some authors, the word
“will” is used in a large and vague sense, as designating all mental
activity that is translated by movements, no objection can be raised.
But if it be used in the proper, restricted sense, as meaning a fully
conscious, deliberate act, resulting from motive, the statement cannot
be accepted.[122] Volition is a state that makes its appearance somewhat
tardily. It is preceded by a period of appetites, of needs, instincts,
desires, passions; and all these facts of internal activity, translated
into movements; are as apt as the “will” to engender the empirical
notion of cause, i. e., transitive action, i. e., change produced: they
have moreover the advantage of being anterior in chronological order.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account