The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
Just as the plurality of objects perceived in nature, forms the
material of the concept of number; as the diverse durations present
in our consciousness are the material of the concept of time; so our
consciousness of acting, of modifying our self and our environment (a
power which we attribute freely to everything that surrounds us) is the
prime material of the concept of cause. But in order that this concept
may be constituted as such—fixed and determined—a work of abstraction
is needed to isolate and bring into relief its distinctive, essential
characteristic from among all the different elements that compose the
primitive and complex notion of empirical cause (antecedent, consequent,
action or reaction, change, transformation, etc.). This distinctive
characteristic is an invariable relation of sequence (the conditions
being supposed the same); and the establishment of it has been, almost
exclusively, the result of scientific research.
A history of the secular fluctuations in the idea of cause, as affected
by the various philosophical theories and changes of method in the
sciences, would be the best review of the phases of its evolution.
Impossible here to attempt such a task. We may only note the two extreme
points: the speculations of antiquity, and the contemporaneous aspect of
the question.[125]
The ancient philosophers who (at least during the great eras) were at
once metaphysicians and scientists, constructed systems of cosmogony and
assumed “first causes,” which were conceived either as forces, principles
of action, motive elements of nature (water, air, fire, atoms), or
as rational types (numbers, ideas). On the other hand they invented
mathematics, and laid the foundations of astronomy and physics. Now, as
regards causality, these essays at the scientific investigation of nature
involved consequences which were not plainly disclosed until a much
later period. They exacted another position,—a passage from subjective
to objective: whether in relation to the fall of bodies, or to a law
of hydrostatics (such as that to which Archimedes gave his name), any
one who studies the physical world necessarily sees its changes from
without. He considers cause no longer as an internal factor revealed
by consciousness, but as a sequence given by the senses. Antecedents,
consequents, invariable succession, are for him the only useful data.
Conditions equal cause; and the important determination is that not of an
operating entity, but of a constant relation. This—the only scientific
conception of cause—it is which is covered by Stuart Mill’s definition:
“Cause is the sum of the positive and negative conditions, which, when
given, are followed by an invariable consequent.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account