The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
It follows that in proportion as we ascend in generalisation we rise,
not into vacuity, as has been said, but into the simple—as also, it
must be confessed, into the approximate. The relatively empty concepts
(there are none that are absolutely void of content) are the product
of a discontinuous generalisation which prevents descent without
interruption or omission into the concrete. Of course these are chiefly
encountered in the world of pure speculation. They are names representing
a knowledge that is incomplete, partial, inadequate, or ill-organised;
they correspond not to elimination of what is useless, but to deficit of
what is necessary. Having no possible contact with reality, they float
in an unreal atmosphere, and are material for a fragile and quickly
crumbling architecture. The aim of thinking by concepts is to substitute
for complex states, simpler conditions that may be turned and re-turned
in every possible sense, in order the better to discover their relations:
whereas here, by the nature of things, the unconscious activity, the
labor that operates silently in the lower strata, is applied to a soil
that is full of faults and fissures, and can but project a false light
into consciousness.
It has frequently been stated that symbolic thought is thinking by
substitution. This formula is admissible only when we recognise that
the substitute supposes, nay expects, the _actual_ existence of that
for which it is substituted. Substitution is valid in consciousness,
but not for the total operation. To sum up in a word: the psychology of
abstraction and generalisation, is in a great measure the _psychology of
the unconscious_.
We have merely studied general ideas in so far as they have an assignable
origin in experience, and do not transcend its limits. Are there, as some
maintain, notions anterior to any sensory intuition—that can by no means
nor effort be derived from empirical data? It is not our part to discuss
this question. The thesis—whether or no it be legitimate—is a contention
in favor of innate ideas, and in whatever fashion it is conceived (_à
priori_ forms, hereditary disposition, cerebral conformation), it is the
problem of the ultimate constitution of human intelligence, which we have
rigorously eliminated from our present subject.
FOOTNOTES
[1] _La parole_ is here, and subsequently, translated by _speech_; _le
mot_ by _words_, or _language_,—_verbal_ language being throughout
understood.—_Trans._
[2] Schmidkunz, _Ueber die Abstraction_. Halle: Stricker, 1889. This
little work of forty-three pages contains a good historical and
theoretical exposition of the question.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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