The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
I still however felt scruples in the matter. Was not the investigation
as conducted on these lines a little artificial? In point of fact,
general terms most frequently occur as members of a phrase, co-operating
with others, and connected with them by certain relations. I therefore
recommenced my inquiry, using the same method, but replacing words by
phrases. The general propositions employed are purposely trite, to avoid
contradiction, and to ascertain the immediate mental state. They were as
follows:
Cause invariably precedes effect.—Infinity has several meanings.—Is Space
infinite?—Has Time any limits?—Law is a necessary relation.—I need not
enlarge upon the results: they are _precisely the same_ as for words. In
every case, and for each person, there is one predominating word which
absorbs all the content of the phrase, and is a substitute for it. On
this the instantaneous mental operation is concentrated.
If of the concrete type, the subject sees images. In the second phrase,
e. g., everything converges on the word _infinity_. Replies: Sensation
of obscurity and depth, vague luminous circles, a sort of cupola, a
never-receding horizon, etc. If a typographic visualist, the printed
sentence is seen less clearly than the simple words: “in minute
characters; no capitals”; some persons glimpse it rapidly: others see
only “the principal word printed.”
For the pure auditory type, the answer is always very simple. “I hear the
sentence, I see absolutely nothing.”
The new method therefore simply confirms the previous observations, with
no variations. This identity of result seems to me to militate against
a distinction admitted by many authors. In the classical treatises a
distinction is made between “necessary ideas” and “necessary truths”
(I use their terms uncritically), i. e., general concepts and general
propositions. Example: cause, principle of causality. In my opinion
there is merely a difference of form between the two positions, the one
psychological, the other logical. A concept is a judgment in a state
of envelopment, or of result. The proposition is a word in the state
of development. The difference is not material, but formal; it is the
passage from synthesis to analysis.
I thought that after an interval of two years it might be interesting
to repeat the same inquiry on the same people; but the results were
not encouraging in this direction. Some, remembering the previous
investigation, declared that “they felt themselves influenced
beforehand.” Others, who had a more vague recollection (perhaps because
they did not understand the object of the inquiry) gave answers analogous
to their former replies. In short, notwithstanding the lapse of time, and
change of circumstances, each seemed to be consistent with his former
self.
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