Under the guidance of the biogenetic law, and on the basis of the evidence we have obtained, we now turn to the interesting task of determining the series of man’s animal ancestors. Phylogeny us a whole is an inductive science. From the totality of the biological processes in the life of plants, animals, and man we have gathered a confident inductive idea that the whole organic population of our planet has been moulded on a harmonious law of evolution. All the interesting phenomena that we meet in ontogeny and paleontology, comparative anatomy and dysteleology, the distribution and habits of organisms—all the important general laws that we abstract from the phenomena of these sciences, and combine in harmonious unity—are the broad bases of our great biological induction. But when we come to the application of this law, and seek to determine with its aid the origin of the various species of organisms, we are compelled to frame hypotheses that have essentially a _deductive_ character, and are inferences from the general law to particular cases. But these special deductions are just as much justified and necessitated by the rigorous laws of logic as the inductive conclusions on which the whole theory of evolution is built. The doctrine of the animal ancestry of the human race is a special deduction of this kind, and follows with logical necessity from the general inductive law of evolution. I must point out at once, however, that the certainty of these evolutionary hypotheses, which rest on clear special deductions, is not always equally strong. Some of these inferences are now beyond question; in the case of others it depends on the knowledge and the competence of the inquirer what degree of certainty he attributes to them. In any case, we must distinguish between the _ absolute_ certainty of the general (inductive) theory of descent and the _relative_ certainty of special (deductive) evolutionary hypotheses. We can never determine the whole ancestral series of an organism with the same confidence with which we hold the general theory of evolution as the sole scientific explanation of organic modifications. The special indication of stem-forms in detail will always be more or less incomplete and hypothetical. This is quite natural. The evidence on which we build is imperfect, and always will be imperfect; just as in comparative philology.