The arguments which he employed in favour of his revolutionary proposals are of sufficient interest and importance, perhaps, to merit consideration. The past histories of the two navies showed, he argued, that the introduction of improvement or of innovation into either navy was shortly afterwards followed by its introduction into the other; so that there was never any important change in the relative naval strength of the two nations. It followed, therefore, that the only means by which power could be wrested from the possessor of it, must be such a change of system as would render useless the existing means by which that power was sustained. How could this be accomplished? Foreign nations had always felt the innate strength of England, residing in the race of splendid seamen (a highly specialized profession) who formed so great a part of her population. France especially had felt her own weakness in not possessing a reserve, a nursery of seamen, such as England had. If only seamanship could be discounted----! M. Paixhans proceeded to show that the coming of the steamer was itself an event which would go a long way to discount a superiority in seamanship. The accursed English “devil boat,”[105] which had begun to spread its pall of smoke over all the northern waters, might be, in truth, a potent friend to France. Steam vessels required only a small and unskilled personnel to man them, instead of prime seamen. Steam vessels could always outstrip sailing ships, and thus could choose their own range and accept or decline battle as occasion required. Moreover, the effect of shell fire would be to upset completely the balance of power existing between big ships and little ships, as such. Instead of size being a measure of power, it would be a measure of vulnerability. The larger the ship the more she would be endangered. Costly three-deckers would cease to exist, and in their place small steam vessels, fast and heavily armed, easily manœuvred and perhaps encased in armour, would hold power. Thus the great obstacle to the acquirement by France of a large naval force--the necessity for a numerous and experienced personnel--would be easily removed. In short, the adoption of his scheme would in any case be most favourable to France. Even if it were simultaneously adopted by Great Britain its adoption would at least ensure that in future the naval power of the two states would be in proportion to the strength of their _whole_ population, instead of only that part of it familiarized with maritime affairs.