The Evolution of Naval ArmamentRobertson, Frederick Leslie
History
The Evolution of Naval Armament
Robertson, Frederick Leslie
Naval art and science -- History; Ordnance, Naval -- History; Warships -- History
France need feel no hesitation in placing herself in
comparison with England.... Never was the policy of England so yielding
and considerate towards France as at the present day. And then, with
respect to the vexed question of the invasion, it is certain that
Napoleon III has the means of effecting it with greater ease and far
greater chance of success than his uncle.”
The means was steam power. But the much-talked-of invasion was never
to be attempted. Other events intervened, other developments took
place, which reduced the tension between the two great naval powers and
removed for an indefinite time the danger, which the Leipsic article
disinterestedly pointed out, of war under novel and unprecedentedly
terrible conditions: with shell guns and wooden unarmoured steam
warships.
CHAPTER X
THE IRONCLAD
The year 1860 marks the most dramatic, swift, and far-reaching change
which has ever befallen war material: the supersession of the wooden
ship-of-the-line by the modern battleship in its earliest form. What
were the causes, suddenly realized or acknowledged, which impelled this
revolutionary change, and what were the circumstances which moulded
the new form of naval construction? This final chapter will attempt to
show. Before descending to a detailed examination of this evolution,
however, let us trace out the most striking features of the transition;
their measure of accuracy can be estimated by the light of the
subsequent narration of progress.
In the first place, then, we remark that, potentially, from the time
when shell-throwing ordnance was introduced into the French, and then
as a counter-measure into our own fleet, unarmoured wooden ships were
doomed. Strange it seems that so long a time elapsed before this fact
was realized; though it is true that with spherical shells and small
explosive charges the destructive effects of shell fire were not
greatly superior to those of solid shot, that fuzes were unreliable,
that trials of artillery against material were rarely resorted to,
and that, moreover, no opportunity occurred between 1822 and the
outbreak of the Crimean War to demonstrate in actual sea-fighting such
superiority as actually existed. Implicit trust was placed in our
fine sailing ships. So long as solid shot were used, indeed, these
timber-built ships were admirably suited for the line of battle;
as size and strength increased and as our methods of construction
improved the ship gained an increasing advantage over the gun, defence
increasingly mastered attack, to such a degree that by the end of the
long wars with France the ship-of-the-line had become almost unsinkable
by gun-fire. But so soon as shell guns were established--even with
spherical shells fired from smooth-bore ordnance--wooden ships
loomed easy targets for destruction. For a long time this disquieting
conclusion was ignored or boldly denied; expert opinion with sagacity
turned a blind eye to the portentous evidence presented to it of the
power of shell.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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