The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to EinsteinD'Abro, A. (Aram)
Science
The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to Einstein
D'Abro, A. (Aram)
Relativity (Physics); Science -- Methodology
The only charge that might be directed against the scientific attitude
(which in this case is also that of the man in the street) is that this
objective world resolves itself into a series of inferences, a mere
mental construct, hence cannot possess the same measure of reality as
the impressions we experience directly. The majority of scientists
would grant the justice of this charge if by “what we experience
directly” we mean our awareness of sensations. But they would
strenuously oppose the claims of the neo-realist who endeavours to
extend the meaning of these words so as to embrace the existence of his
sensa and sense-objects; these represent nothing but inferences which
he has drawn from his awareness of sensations. And this is precisely
the error into which the neo-realist falls when, on perceiving a
red flash in the sky, he talks of a star bursting into prominence
“there-now.” If he wishes to avoid inferences, he should confine
himself to saying: “I experience ‘here-now’ a luminous impression on
a dark background.” For all he knows, the luminous impression may be
due to an aviator’s light, or to a firefly, or to a purely subjective
hallucination.
[Pg 177]
At any rate, the point we wish to stress is that while it is correct
to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views or
perceptions, we should not forget to add that the private views are
themselves the product of a synthesis of sensations. But inasmuch as
science must deal with the general, and not merely with the particular,
and inasmuch as it is the common objective world that renders this
general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist
will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views,
though just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. We must
recognise, therefore, that the common objective world, whether such
a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is indispensable to
science, if in no other capacity than as a working hypothesis. And
neo-realism, as we have said, when pursued consistently, renders
a collective view impossible. Furthermore, from the standpoint of
science, whether it be classical physics, relativity, physiology or
psychology, neo-realism is untenable, for under no circumstances can
vision and our knowledge of nature in general be considered a matter
of direct apprehension. In much the same way, we know that 7 times
8 is 56, and we obtain this result immediately, without reflection
and without having to count on our fingers. Were it not for the fact
that the neo-realist recollects the difficulty he experienced in
learning the multiplication table, he would presumably be telling us
that our knowledge of the properties of numbers was also a matter of
direct recognition. From the standpoint of science, there is very
little difference between the alleged immediacy of perception and our
knowledge of the product of 7 times 8. Neither of these two forms of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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