The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to EinsteinD'Abro, A. (Aram)
Science
The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to Einstein
D'Abro, A. (Aram)
Relativity (Physics); Science -- Methodology
We may conclude by saying that it appears unjustified to refer to
Einstein’s time and simultaneity determinations as depending on the
behaviour of light. They depend on the processes of nature of which the
behaviour of light is but a particular illustration. We must therefore
amend Dr. Whitehead’s criticism of relativity, as making the very
meaning of simultaneity depend on light signals, by replacing the words
“light signals” by the words “physical processes.” But when amended
[Pg 186]
in this way, the criticism loses all its force. For we may speak of
simultaneity throughout space, of an instantaneous space, as much as
we please, but until we know enough about these evasive concepts to be
able to distinguish events that are simultaneous from those which are
not, we cannot claim to have any definite idea of what we are talking
about. On this score, both classical science and relativity are in
perfect agreement.
[Pg 187]
CHAPTER XVI
PRACTICAL CONGRUENCE IN RELATIVITY
IN a preceding chapter we mentioned certain of the most important
aspects of the problem of physical space. We saw that the concept of
spatial equality or congruence was deemed to have arisen from the facts
of experience. Certain objects appeared to maintain the same visual
aspect wherever displaced, provided we modified our own positions as
observers in an appropriate way. But such fundamental recognitions were
too vague to be of any use to science; hence congruent bodies were
defined as those which, when maintained at constant temperature and
pressure, coincided when placed side by side.
Congruence, as thus defined, involved physical measurements with
material bodies; and, as Poincaré remarked, all we could ever discover
in this way would reduce to the laws of configuration of solid bodies,
space itself transcending our experiments, since the bodies might
behave one way or another in the same space. Poincaré’s attitude
drives us to complete agnosticism so far as the geometry of space is
concerned. If physical measurements are denied us, there is no means of
solving the problem of space, for we have no a priori means of
deciding that the structure of space is this or that. Logical arguments
are of no avail, for they do not lead us to any definite solution, only
to a variety of possibilities. We are thus thrown back on Poincaré’s
main contention, i.e., “space is amorphous.” In it we can define
congruence in any way we please (theoretical congruence), although
for reasons of practical convenience it is necessary to be guided by
the properties of so-called rigid bodies. Thus we obtain a physical
definition of practical congruence, which permits us to determine the
geometry that for all practical purposes is to be called the geometry
of real physical space.
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