The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to EinsteinD'Abro, A. (Aram)
Science
The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to Einstein
D'Abro, A. (Aram)
Relativity (Physics); Science -- Methodology
Let us consider the problem of illusions. For instance, we experience
an aggregate of visual impressions which we unhesitatingly ascribe to
the presence of a table situated “there in the room.” Yet all we have
any right to be positive about is that certain visual impressions have
been experienced; our belief in the existence of the table situated
“there” results from an inference, a judgment formulated in an attempt
to ascribe a cause to our visual sensations. By an association of ideas
and by recalling past experience, we feel justified in claiming the
existence of the table “there” as we see it. In the majority of cases
our judgment will be correct, but in a certain number of instances
it will be erroneous. Such would be the case were we to be viewing
the reflection of a table in the mirror. An illusion is therefore an
error of judgment. And what prompts us to state that our belief in the
object behind the mirror is an illusion? Obviously, the bare fact that
on testing the matter out in a variety of different ways it appears
impossible to credit the table with any existence at the spot where
we claim to see it in the common objective world of science. In much
the same way we see a mirage and interpret our sensations as connoting
the presence of water. Yet were a meteor to fall into the water it
would not appear to be extinguished by the waters of the lake. Kindred
observations of an indirect order would finally compel us to recognise
that our initial judgment was at fault, and that no water lay before us.
And now let us consider the FitzGerald contraction. Is it an illusion?
To this question our reply must unhesitatingly be in the negative.
Not only should we perceive the contraction were our eyes capable
of yielding a snap-shot picture of a rapidly moving object, but in
addition every conceivable physical experiment performed in our frame
would indicate that the contraction was physically present. And yet
we have said that the contraction differed essentially from the
one contemplated by Lorentz, generated as was the latter by a real
compression caused by the motion of the object through the stagnant
ether. The explanation of the dilemma is as follows:
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