Without asking whether the long experience alluded to has ever been fortified by the trial and the failure of an opposite course, it may be at once stated that this mode of arriving at truth is contrary to the result of long experience in matters of science. In all discussions on those subjects, it is found far more conducive to truth, if either party in discussing a mooted point discover in his own argument a flaw, unobserved by his opponent, that he should immediately point it out, and that they should both apply their minds to repair it, and if unsuccessful, admit it. The same course is pursued with regard to facts; every circumstance, however apparently remote, is contributed by both inquirers to the common stock, without the slightest care as to its bearings on one or the other side of the question. Facts thus conveyed for the first time to the mind of one of the parties, often recall to his memory analogous facts, and thus the materials of reasoning or of induction become largely increased. § To this supposed legal principle, it may be fairly objected that it is entirely a theoretical view. To be convinced of this it is enough to appeal to every man who has ever sat on a jury or heard one addressed by counsel. He well knows that the very first effort of the learned advocate is to attempt to persuade the jury that he is no advocate at all. This line is sustained throughout his address, and his great object is to convince them that he himself personally believes both the facts to which his witnesses testify, and the inferences he adduces from their evidence. The more skilful the advocate, the more he endeavours to persuade the jury that he is merely an impartial observer, assisting them in arriving at a just conclusion. The effects of long habit in thus mystifying less practised reasoners, cannot fail to be injurious to the moral character of the man. Take a case of title to property, on which a barrister is consulted. Suppose the holder has no right whatever to it, yet will the barrister by every means his knowledge and ingenuity can suggest, help his client to rob some other person of his property. It is useless to say that in such circumstances the attorney conceals certain facts of his case, and does not put the facts to the counsel in this plain way. On such occasions the most skilful counsel are always employed, and they are certainly competent, _if they choose it_, to ascertain the real state of the case. In criminal cases such attempts to mislead juries are still more reprehensible. § If the principle now discussed is sound, it is capable of application to another subject—the press. But strangely enough, lawyers, more than any other class, abuse the press because it treats its subject commercially, and refuse to admit that rule in the case of editors of newspapers, which they claim as a sanction for themselves. A little examination, however, will show that the conduct of the press is much more defensible than that of the bar.