The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public BenefitsMandeville, Bernard
Philosophy
The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits
Mandeville, Bernard
Charity-schools -- Early works to 1800; Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Virtue -- Early works to 1800
The ostracism of the Greeks was a sacrifice of valuable men made
to epidemic envy, and often applied as an infallible remedy to cure
and prevent the mischiefs of popular spleen and rancour. A victim of
state often appeases the murmurs of a whole nation, and after-ages
frequently wonder at barbarities of this nature, which, under the
same circumstances, they would have committed themselves. They are
compliments to the people's malice, which is never better gratified,
than when they can see a great man humbled. We believe that we love
justice, and to see merit rewarded; but if men continue long in the
first posts of honour, half of us grow weary of them, look for their
faults, and, if we can find none, we suppose they hide them, and it
is much if the greatest part of us do not wish them discarded. This
foul play, the best of men ought ever to apprehend from all who are
not their immediate friends or acquaintance, because nothing is more
tiresome to us, than the repetition of praises we have no manner of
share in.
The more a passion is a compound of many others, the more difficult it
is to define it; and the more it is tormenting to those that labour
under it, the greater cruelty it is capable of inspiring them with
against others: Therefore nothing is more whimsical or mischievous
than jealousy, which is made up of love, hope, fear, and a great deal
of envy: The last has been sufficiently treated of already; and what I
have to say of fear, the reader will find under Remark on l. 321. So
that the better to explain and illustrate this odd mixture, the
ingredients I shall further speak of in this place, are hope and love.
Hoping is wishing with some degree of confidence, that the thing
wished for will come to pass. The firmness and imbecility of our hope
depend entirely on the greater or lesser degree of our confidence,
and all hope includes doubt; for when our confidence is arrived to
that height, as to exclude all doubts, it becomes a certainty, and
we take for granted what we only hoped for before. A silver inkhorn
may pass in speech, because every body knows what we mean by it,
but a certain hope cannot: For a man who makes use of an epithet that
destroys the essence of the substantive he joins it to, can have no
meaning at all; and the more clearly we understand the force of the
epithet, and the nature of the substantive, the more palpable is the
nonsense of the heterogeneous compound. The reason, therefore, why
it is not so shocking to some to hear a man speak of certain hope,
as if he should talk of hot ice, or liquid oak, is not because there
is less nonsense contained in the first, than there is in either
of the latter; but because the word hope, I mean the essence of it,
is not so clearly understood by the generality of the people, as the
words and essence of ice and oak are.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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