Meanwhile, the envoys of the latter were not less urgent on their employer to support the Emperor with an army. "The business of assisting the Shah" — thus they wrote in December, 1783 — "must go on if we wish to be secure in India, or regarded as a nation of faith and honour." Mr. Hastings was not deaf to these considerations, and subsequent events proved their entire soundness. He desired to sustain the authority of the Empire, because he foresaw nothing from its dissolution but an alternative between Chaos and the Mahrattas; and, but for the opposition of his council in Calcutta, he would have interposed, and interposed after his fashion, with effect. Yet his not doing so was afterwards made the ground of one of the charges (No. 18) against him, and he was accused of having intrigued in the interest of Madhoji Sindhia, the Patel. That Mr. Hastings, when overruled in his desire of anticipating Sindhia in Court influence at Dehli, preferred seeing the latter succeed, rather than the Empire should fall a prey to complete anarchy; that he "turned the circumstance to advantage" — to use Grant Duff's phrase — was neither contrary to sound statesmanship, nor to the particular views of the British Government, which was then occupied in completing the treaty of Salbai. Under this compact Central India was pacified, and the Carnatic protected from the encroachments of the notorious Haidar Ali Khan, and his son, the equally famous Tippu Sahib. It is important here to observe that the Calcutta Gazettes of the day contain several notices of the progress of the Sikhs, and the feeble opposition offered to them by the courtiers. All these things called for prompt action.