Nobody ever doubts, as far as I can see, the fact that all personal ties between two individuals consist not only of ideas, but also of feelings, and that they are influenced no less by the feelings the two individuals mutually inspire than by the ideas they form of each other. To ascertain, _e. g._, if there be friendship between two people, one seeks to know their feelings towards each other, as well as what they think about each other. The relation between a parent and a child is in our society chiefly determined by their mutual feelings. And in a case where these feelings are absent, this relationship--in spite of all legal, moral, and other factors which tend to maintain its form--is deeply affected. It may be taken for granted that the sentimental side most essentially determines in a given society any kind of personal relationship. And in the same society the character of a given personal relation--be it parental kinship or anything else--varies with the intensity of the feeling and is essentially defined by the latter. It may be accepted also, that in different societies the types of feelings corresponding to given personal relations may vary according to the society, and may define in each one this given relation in its most essential character. In other words, the concept of collective feelings can be applied as well as the concept of collective ideas.[556] By this is to be understood certain types of feeling, which being dependent on corresponding collective ideas possess the same essential character as the latter: they exist in a certain society, and are transmitted from generation to generation; they impose themselves on the individual mind, and possess the character of necessity; they are deeply connected with certain social institutions; in fact they stand to them in the relation of functional dependence (in the mathematical sense). So, for instance, it is clear that in the hypothetical primitive promiscuous society, in which _ex hypothesi_ there would be no individual relationship, the feelings of affection for the individual offspring could not exist. We could only speak of the "collective feeling" of _group affection_. So it seems to me that the relation of parents to children cannot be treated with any approach to completeness without seriously taking into account its emotional character. [556] As is well known, we are indebted for the concept of _collective ideas_ to the French school of Prof. Durkheim and his associates. Throughout this study, and especially in this chapter, I have done my best to avail myself of this valuable methodological standpoint.