Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will
enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the
execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to
destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the
sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal
government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its
authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition
to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important
consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support
the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in
this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and
LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of
the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity
of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the
national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its
laws.[1] Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the
consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground
to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the
Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.
If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any
inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly
possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best
government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and
precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the
adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the
national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or
to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of
ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a
conduct?
PUBLIUS.
[1] The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend
to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its
proper place, be fully detected.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XXVIII.
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered)
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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