Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it
will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will
require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will
require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are
altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed within very
moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we
are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward
to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to be
framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a
combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to
the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can
be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be
lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate
necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their
nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true,
perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to
answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge
the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain those
establishments which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of
peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of
folly, to stop at this point, and to leave the government intrusted
with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity
to provide for the protection of the community against future invasions
of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions? If, on the
contrary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an
indefinite power of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though
it is easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a
rational judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we
may safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward
their data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and
uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable
duration of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of
internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of
no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people,
it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that
commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve
contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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