Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the judges, which
the constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally
varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently
drawn within legislative cognizance and determination. Those who wish
to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads, may
consult the journals of the council, which are in print. Some of them,
it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected
with the war; but the greater part of them may be considered as the
spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government. It appears, also,
that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent
breaches of the constitution. There are three observations, however,
which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of the
instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the
war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECONDLY, in
most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or
the known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRDLY, the
executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the
other States by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it
has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive
council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual
responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from
mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of
course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive department is
administered by a single hand, or by a few hands.
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations
is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits
of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the
powers of government in the same hands.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XLIX.
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of
Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
The author of the “Notes on the State of Virginia,” quoted in the last
paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a
constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a
convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the
establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. The plan, like
every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original,
comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it
equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government and an
enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought
to be guarded.
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