Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a
similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,
and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated
under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,
consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate
government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and
defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends
and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,
nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we
still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is
the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a
common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those
ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic
difference between a league and a government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, —the only proper
objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the
idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words,
a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty
annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or
recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted
in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or
by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the
COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the
last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or
communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a
court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be
enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of
their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by
the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to
the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach
of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things
can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent
man choose to commit his happiness to it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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