_Meta._ ii. 4; 1000 a 25. And Empedokles who, one might think, spoke most consistently, even he had the same experience, for he asserts that a certain first principle, Strife, is the cause of destruction; but one might think none the less that even this causes generation out of the unity; for all other things are from this as their source, except god. _Meta._ ii. 4; 1000 a 32. And apart from these verses (vv. 104-107) it would be evident, for if strife were not existing in things, all would be one, as he says; for when they come together, strife comes to a stand last of all. Wherefore it results that for him the most blessed God has less intelligence than other beings; for he does not know all the elements; for he does not have strife, and knowledge of the like is by the like. _Meta._ ii. 4; 1000 b 16. He does not make clear any cause of necessity. But, nevertheless, he says thus much alone consistently, for he does not make some beings perishable and others imperishable, but he makes all perishable except the elements. And the problem now under discussion is why some things exist and others do not, if they are from the same (elements). _Meta._ xi. 10; 1075 b 2. And Empedokles speaks in a manner, for he makes friendship the good. And this is the first principle, both as the moving cause, for it brings things together; and as matter, for it is part of the mixture. _Ethic._ vii. 5; 1147 b 12. He has the power to speak but not to understand, as a drunken man repeating verses of Empedokles. _Ethic._ viii. 2; 1155 b 7. Others, including Empedokles, say the opposite, that the like seeks the like. _Moral._ ii. 11; 1208 b 11. And he says that when a dog was accustomed always to sleep on the same tile, Empedokles was asked why the dog always sleeps on the same tile, and he answered that the dog had some likeness to the tile, so that the likeness is the reason for its frequenting it. _Poet._ 1; 1447 b 16. Homer and Empedokles have nothing in common but the metre, so that the former should be called a poet, the latter should rather be called a student of nature. Fr. 65; Diog. Laer. viii. 57. Aristotle, in the _Sophist_, says that Empedokles first discovered rhetoric and Zeon dialectic. Fr. 66; Diog. Laer. viii. 63. Aristotle says that (Empedokles) became free and estranged from every form of rule, if indeed he refused the royal power that was granted to him, as Xanthos says in his account of him, evidently much preferring his simplicity. PASSAGES IN DIELS’ ‘DOXOGRAPHI GRAECI’ RELATING TO EMPEDOKLES.