Our telegrams from Rome must have misfired. There was no one at the station to meet us. Were they all dead? Or--but evidently London had not yet been evacuated. Indeed, as we drove through the streets, we wondered if peace had been declared. What a contrast! Here, thousands of sleek and well-dressed people, jostling each other for places in the music-halls; and out there, thousands of people, hungry, thirsty, and in rags, jostling each other to escape every conceivable form of horror. But we were, thank God, at home again. We had done nothing wonderful--women are not allowed to do wonderful things--but we were content to feel that we had contributed our tiny share towards the relief of suffering, and we had, perhaps, made it easier for other women to do more in future times. PART IV But this story will have failed in its purpose if it has not served as a demonstration of three facts. It should show, without need of further proof, that women can be of service, not only in base hospitals of war, both in subsidiary positions, and in positions of command--that had already been shown--but in flying field hospitals at the front. Thus men can be set free for the fighting line. Much work at present done by the Royal Army Medical Corps could safely be entrusted to women. The proof given of the capacity of women to endure hardships and privations incidental to campaigns, also points to the possibility of the employment of women along the lines of communication, in various forms of war work now performed by men. Much valuable fighting material could thus be liberated. The story should also show, if only, alas! in a small way, something of the courage, dignity, and spirit of the Serbian people. It is difficult for those who have not had first-hand evidence, to realise the heroism of the Serbian nation, not only during their defeat and their retreat, October to December, 1915, but also during the summer of political temptation in 1915. At that time Serbia understood, only too well, the intentions of the Bulgarians, and if she had acted as her political instinct prompted her, the inevitable clash would have occurred, not at the moment of Bulgaria's choice, but at a time favourable to Serbia. It is useless now to conjecture the effect of this "might-have-been" on the history of the war. But in the summer of 1915, the temptation for Serbia to strike at her own convenience, must have been great. And whether the Allies, in urging Serbia to abstain, were right, or wrong, successful or unsuccessful, they owe much to Serbia for her loyal adherence to their policy. Serbia was justified in expecting from them, in return, the help which never came.