The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire; a history of the Osmanlis up to the death of Bayezid I (1300-1403)Gibbons, Herbert Adams
History
The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire; a history of the Osmanlis up to the death of Bayezid I (1300-1403)
Gibbons, Herbert Adams
Turkey -- History -- 1288-1453
It certainly did. Bayezid, who had been directing the siege of
Constantinople, knew no more about the khalif and the sultan and the
‘far-off countries of the miscreants’ than did Froissart. Neither he nor
his ancestors had ever had dealings with the Moslem princes of Asia.
Persians, ‘Saracens’ and Egyptians were lacking in his army. He
gathered together his trained warriors, called upon his Christian
vassals for their quotas, and set forth over the well-known route to the
Danube. From several recent campaigns, he and his soldiers were
thoroughly familiar with the country through which they passed, and in
which the people were less afraid of him than they were of the
Christians who had come to deliver them. When, after two weeks’ march,
he pitched his camp near Nicopolis, he was simply returning to a place
where twice before the Ottoman arms had been victorious.
Sigismund was dismayed at the prompt appearance of Bayezid with an army
which was reported to him in numbers varying from one hundred and twenty
thousand to two hundred thousand. In spite of his brave words to the
chevaliers, Sigismund knew the worth of the Osmanlis as fighting-men,
and that they could not be brushed aside by a few impetuous cavalry
charges. So he begged Jean de Nevers and his companions to consult with
him, and to formulate a definite plan of action. He suggested, and won
over to this opinion the Sieur de Coucy, who was the most experienced
warrior among the chevaliers, that a reconnaissance be made first of all
to determine Bayezid’s position and intentions. Then, if Bayezid was
actually moving to the attack, or on the point of moving, it would be
the part of wisdom for the westerners to allow the foot-soldiers of
Hungary and the Wallachians to sustain the first attack. The valiant
horsemen and western mercenaries should form a second line, whether it
be in attack or defence.
The chevaliers were furious at this suggestion. Philippe d’Artois, Comte
d’Eu and Grand Constable of France, who knew Sigismund best from longer
association with him, suspected him of an attempt to rob the chevaliers
of the glory of defeating Bayezid. ‘Yes, yes,’ he cried, ‘the king of
Hungary wants to have the flower of the day and the honour. We have the
advance-guard, and already has he given it to us. So he wants to take it
away from us and have the first battle. Whoever believes in this, I
shall not.’ Then turning to the chevalier who carried his banner, he
called out, ‘Forward banner, in the name of God and of Saint George, for
they will see me to-day a good chevalier’.[531] This action was
contagious. Without knowing where the enemy was, without thinking where
or how far they were going, without waiting to agree upon a concerted
action with the bulk of their army, the French, German, and English
noblemen rushed forward to make the last charge of European chivalry
against the followers of Mohammed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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