But the problem would have no meaning if, before any observation, I had not fashioned an _a priori_ idea of the probability of this or that law, and of the chances of error to which I am exposed. If my instruments are good (and that I knew before making the observations), I shall not permit my curve to depart much from the points which represent the rough measurements. If they are bad, I may go a little further away from them in order to obtain a less sinuous curve; I shall sacrifice more to regularity. Why then is it that I seek to trace a curve without sinuosities? It is because I consider _a priori_ a law represented by a continuous function (or by a function whose derivatives of high order are small), as more probable than a law not satisfying these conditions. Without this belief, the problem of which we speak would have no meaning; interpolation would be impossible; no law could be deduced from a finite number of observations; science would not exist. Fifty years ago physicists considered, other things being equal, a simple law as more probable than a complicated law. They even invoked this principle in favor of Mariotte's law as against the experiments of Regnault. To-day they have repudiated this belief; and yet, how many times are they compelled to act as though they still held it! However that may be, what remains of this tendency is the belief in continuity, and we have just seen that if this belief were to disappear in its turn, experimental science would become impossible. VI. THE THEORY OF ERRORS.--We are thus led to speak of the theory of errors, which is directly connected with the problem of the probability of causes. Here again we find _effects_, to wit, a certain number of discordant observations, and we seek to divine the _causes_, which are, on the one hand, the real value of the quantity to be measured; on the other hand, the error made in each isolated observation. It is necessary to calculate what is _a posteriori_ the probable magnitude of each error, and consequently the probable value of the quantity to be measured. But as I have just explained, we should not know how to undertake this calculation if we did not admit _a priori_, that is to say, before all observation, a law of probability of errors. Is there a law of errors? The law of errors admitted by all calculators is Gauss's law, which is represented by a certain transcendental curve known under the name of 'the bell.' But first it is proper to recall the classic distinction between systematic and accidental errors. If we measure a length with too long a meter, we shall always find too small a number, and it will be of no use to measure several times; this is a systematic error. If we measure with an accurate meter, we may, however, make a mistake; but we go wrong, now too much, now too little, and when we take the mean of a great number of measurements, the error will tend to grow small. These are accidental errors.