Still more; if the two hemispheres, in place of being red and blue, had
been yellow and green, how should I have interpreted the revolution of
the sphere? Before, the red succeeded the blue, now the green succeeds
the yellow; and yet I say that the two spheres have undergone the same
revolution, that each has turned about its axis; yet I can not say that
the green is to yellow as the red is to blue; how then am I led to
decide that the two spheres have undergone the _same_ displacement?
Evidently because, in one case as in the other, I am able to reestablish
the original sensation by going around the sphere, by making the same
movements, and I know that I have made the same movements because I have
felt the same muscular sensations; to know it, I do not need, therefore,
to know geometry in advance and to represent to myself the movements of
my body in geometric space.
Another example: An object is displaced before my eye; its image was
first formed at the center of the retina; then it is formed at the
border; the old sensation was carried to me by a nerve fiber ending at
the center of the retina; the new sensation is carried to me by
_another_ nerve fiber starting from the border of the retina; these two
sensations are qualitatively different; otherwise, how could I
distinguish them?
Why then am I led to decide that these two sensations, qualitatively
different, represent the same image, which has been displaced? It is
because I _can follow the object with the eye_ and by a displacement of
the eye, voluntary and accompanied by muscular sensations, bring back
the image to the center of the retina and reestablish the primitive
sensation.
I suppose that the image of a red object has gone from the center _A_ to
the border _B_ of the retina, then that the image of a blue object goes
in its turn from the center _A_ to the border _B_ of the retina; I shall
decide that these two objects have undergone the _same_ displacement.
Why? Because in both cases I shall have been able to reestablish the
primitive sensation, and that to do it I shall have had to execute the
_same_ movement of the eye, and I shall know that my eye has executed
the same movement because I shall have felt the _same_ muscular
sensations.
If I could not move my eye, should I have any reason to suppose that the
sensation of red at the center of the retina is to the sensation of red
at the border of the retina as that of blue at the center is to that of
blue at the border? I should only have four sensations qualitatively
different, and if I were asked if they are connected by the proportion I
have just stated, the question would seem to me ridiculous, just as if I
were asked if there is an analogous proportion between an auditory
sensation, a tactile sensation and an olfactory sensation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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