For this principle to be only in appearance true, for one to have cause to dread having some day to replace it by one of the analogous principles I have just now contrasted with it, would be necessary our having been misled by some amazing chance, like that which, in the fiction above developed, led into error our imaginary astronomers. Such a hypothesis is too unlikely to delay over. No one will believe that such coincidences can happen; no doubt the probability of two eccentricities being both precisely null, to within errors of observation, is not less than the probability of one being precisely equal to 0.1, for instance, and the other to 0.2, to within errors of observation. The probability of a simple event is not less than that of a complicated event; and yet, if the first happens, we shall not consent to attribute it to chance; we should not believe that nature had acted expressly to deceive us. The hypothesis of an error of this sort being discarded, it may therefore be admitted that in so far as astronomy is concerned, our law has been verified by experiment. But astronomy is not the whole of physics. May we not fear lest some day a new experiment should come to falsify the law in some domain of physics? An experimental law is always subject to revision; one should always expect to see it replaced by a more precise law. Yet no one seriously thinks that the law we are speaking of will ever be abandoned or amended. Why? Precisely because it can never be subjected to a decisive test. First of all, in order that this trial should be complete, it would be necessary that after a certain time all the bodies in the universe should revert to their initial positions with their initial velocities. It might then be seen whether, starting from this moment, they would resume their original paths. But this test is impossible, it can be only partially applied, and, however well it is made, there will always be some bodies which will not revert to their initial positions; thus every derogation of the law will easily find its explanation. This is not all; in astronomy we _see_ the bodies whose motions we study and we usually assume that they are not subjected to the action of other invisible bodies. Under these conditions our law must indeed be either verified or not verified. But it is not the same in physics; if the physical phenomena are due to motions, it is to the motions of molecules which we do not see. If then the acceleration of one of the bodies we see appears to us to depend on _something else_ besides the positions or velocities of other visible bodies or of invisible molecules whose existence we have been previously led to admit, nothing prevents our supposing that this _something else_ is the position or the velocity of other molecules whose presence we have not before suspected. The law will find itself safeguarded.